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Fr l ED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I-EB -2 1982 
STANLEY MARTIN REDD; 
SHEILA M. REDD, his wife; 
STERLING HARDSON REDD; 
JILL D. REDD, his wife; 
PAUL DUTSON; and DONNA 
DUTSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
.-.......------------------------------------
C!.er.[. Su!)l'em' c~urt, Utan 
ADDITION OF NEW 
AUTHORITY TO BRIEF 
OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17231 
Defendant-respondent Western Savings and Loan Company 
("Hestern Savings"), pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby submits additional authority in support 
of its position in the above-entitled case. 
In Lipps v. First American Service Corp., No. 800908 
(Va., January 22, 1982), attached hereto as Exhibit "A", the 
defendant-respondent lender began foreclosure proceedings 
pursuant to a due-on-sale clause because the borrowers had trans-
ferred their property on a contract sale. The lender offered 
to let the purchaser of the land assume the loan upon the payment 
of a two percent (2%) assumption fee and an increase in the 
interest rate from 9-1/2% to 13-3/4%. The purchaser refused 
to assume the loan, thus the lender began foreclosure proceedings 
when the outstanding balance on the loan was not paid. The 
borrowers and the purchaser sought an injunction against the 
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foreclosure on the grounds that the due-on-sale clause was an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation. The trial court and the 
Virginia Supreme Court rejected the borrowers' and purchaser's 
contention. 
In unanimously affirming the trial court's decision, 
the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the following points 
which directly support the arguments Western Savings presented 
to the lower court, in its appellate brief and at oral argument 
conducted over eight months ago, on May 12, 1981: 
1. The court specifically held that the due-on-sale 
clause is not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, see id. 
at 3-6 because it "does not defeat or forfeit the estate 
conveyed [and it] does not affect the quantity or quality of 
the conveyance between [the borrowers] and [the purchaser]. 
Its effect is confined to the acceleration of the due date of 
the indebtedness. Id. at 4. 
2. The court recognized that contracts are 
looked upon favorably by the courts, and that "courts are 
averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of 
public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain." 
Id. at 5, quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 125, 
82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1954). 
Pursuant to Rule 75(p)(3), the correcting pages 
containing the above-described newly uncovered authority are 
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filed herewith. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard W. Giauque 
James R. Holbrook 
Stephen T. Hard 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
~ 
By .~/. ~~~· 
RlCardw:crrauqe 
Attorneys for~ 
Defendant-Respondent 
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Record No. 
,800908 
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Compton, Tilomp~~n. and 
Stephenson, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice 
ALBERT B. LIPPS, ET AL. 
-v- Record No. 800908 
FIRST AMERICAN SERVICE 
CORPORATION, ET AL. 
OPINION BY JUSTICE W. CARRINGTON THOMPSON 
January 22, 1982 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Percy Thornton, Jr., Judge 
In this appeal we determine the validity of a "due-on sale" 
acceleration clause in a deed of trust. The trial court upheld 
the validity of the clause, and we affirm that judgment. I 
On July 27, 1976, Albert B. Lipps and Judith W. Lipps (BorroW-
ers) executed a deed of trust conveying residential real estate I 
in Prince William County to secure First American Savings and Loa~ 
I 
Association (Lender) the payment of a promissory note for $31,500 1 
with interest at the rate of nine and one-half percent per annum. I 
The deed of trust contained the following "due-on sale" accelera-
tion provision (Covenant 17): 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and 
agree as follows: 
17. Transfer of the Prooert : Ass tion. If all or 
any part o t e Property or an nterest t erein is sold or 
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written con-
sent ... Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the 
sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due 
and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accel~ 
erate if, prior co the sale or transfer, Lender and the 
person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred 
reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person 
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on 
the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such 
rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the 
option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and 
if Borrower• s successor in interest has executed a written 
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender 
shall release Borrower from all obligations under this Deed 
of Trust and the Note. 
Pursuant to Code§ 6.1-330.34 1 , the deed of trust also con-
tained this notice in the margin of the first page: "NOTICE: 
Code § 6.1-330.34. Mortgage, etc., to contain not;_ce that; 
debt is sub ·ect to cnll or modification or. conve ance of ;rooert .' 
ere any oan is ma e secure y a mortgage or ec OI trust on i 
real property ... and the note,_ or mortgage or deed of tr~st cvi~·· 
dencing such loan contains a provision that the holder of the not~ 
secured by such mortgage or deed of trust may accelerate payment I 
of or renegotiate the terms of such loan upon sale or conveyPnce I 
of the security property or part thereof, then the mortgage or Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DEBT SECURE:J HEREBY IS SUBJECT TO CALL IN FULL DR TIIE TERMS Tl!ERE-' 
OF BEL~G MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CONVEYANCE OF THE ?RO- I 
PERTY CONVEYED." I 
On April 21, 1979, Borrowers entered into a "Land Contract I 
I 
for Sale of Improved Real Property-Virginia" (Land Contract) with II 
Sandmar Associates, Inc. (Purchaser). In the Land Contract, Pur-
chaser agreed to pay to Borrowers at closing a lump sum of $5,400,i 
to take possession of the property and make all payments due undel 
the note secured by the deed of trust, and to hold Borrowers harml 
less from any liability under the deed of trust. Borrowers agreej 
to execute a general warranty deed to be held in escrow until pay 
ment by Purchaser of the remaining balance of $30,986.97 due on I 
the note at the time of closing. 
Borrowers and Purchaser closed under the Land Contract on 
May 10, 1979, and settlement between the parties reflected the 
charges made in a typical real estate closing. On May 14, 1979, 
Purchaser recorded the Land Cont:Tact in the Clerk's Office of the 
Circuit Court of Prince William County. 
Lender became aware of the Land Contract on October 22, 1979, 
and after investigation, gave notice to Borrowers and Purchaser o 
November 18, 1979, that it was exercising its option to declare 
the balance on the deed of trust note immediately due and payable. 
Lender offered to let Purchaser assume the loan, provided 
that Purchaser (i) make application to assume the loan with satis 
factory credit, (ii) pay two "points" (a two percent assumption 
fee) on the outstanding note balance, and 'ciii) allow the interas 
to be increased to thirteen and one-quarter percent. 
Purchaser refused to make an application to assume the loan. 
Neither Borrowers nor Purchaser paid the outstanding balance?. rluc 
on the deed of trust note as a result of Lender's exercise of 
Covenant 17. On January 7, 1980, the Trustee under the deed of 
deed of trust shall contain in the body or on th7 margin. thereof I 
a statement either in capital letters or underlined, wh1.cn will 
advise the borrower as follows: 11Notice--The Debt. secure~ ~ere~y 1 is subject to call in full or the terms thereof being mod~f ied in 
the event of sale or conveyance of the property conveyed. 
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trust gave notice of the proposed sale of the property. Borrowers, 
and Purchaser petitioned the lower court to enjoin the sale, but 
it denied such injunctive relief. 
On appeal, Borrowers contend that Covenant 17 is invalid as 
an unreasonable restraint on alienation. They assign error to 
the action of the lower court upholding its validity, especially 
where Lender did not prove impairment of security or risk of non-
payment, and to the holding of the trial court that the execution 
and delivery of the Land Contract was a breach of Covenant 17. 
I. Restraint on Alienation. 
Is Covenant 17 an unreasonable restraint on alienation? We 
hold that it is not. In Hutchinson v. ~. 100 Va. 169, 175, 
40 S.E. 655, 657 (1902), we restated the general rule: 
It is well settled in this country and in England, 
from which country we derive the principles of our juris-
prudence, that a gift or grant of a beneficial estate, in 
fee or absolutely, whether legal or equitable, has certain 
legal incidents of which the estate cannot be divested, 
and all conditions adopted for that purpose are necessarily 
repugnant and void. Among those incidents are the donee's 
or grantee's power of alienating such estate, and its lia-
bility for his debts. [Citaeions omitted.] 
The reasons for this doctrine or principle is the 
repugnancy of such restraints upon the ordinary righes 
of property, and that property would thereby be withdrawn 
from the ordinary rules and channels of commerce and trade. 
Since that time, we have had occasion to recognize statutory ex-
ceptions to the doctrine in Sheridan v. ~. 161 Va. 873, 172 
S.E. 508 (1934) (upholding validity of spendthrift truses), and 
to define "reasonableness" in this context in Hercules Powder 
Company v. Continental Can Company, 196 Va. 935, 940, 86 S.E.2d 
128. 131 (1955): 
The reasonableness of a restraint on the use of 
property "is to be determined by considering whether 
it is such only as to afford a fair protection to the 
interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, 
and not so large as to interfere with the interest of 
the public." ~ v. ~. 104 Va. 1,28, 51 S.E. 
817 [1905]. 
The Supreme Court of Ncrth Carolina face<l thi~ identic-11 
problem in~ v. First Federal Savings, et.:c., 289 N.C. 620, 
625-26, 224 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1976), and said' 
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One factor that significantlv affects tl1e nature of 
this acceleration clause so far aS the restraints doctrine 
is conce~ned is the fact that the creditor's right to accel-
erate arises only when the realty is alienated. Thus the 
practical effect of tre due-on-sale clause when it ir'con-
sider7d in is?lation is t~at the owner is encouraged not 
to alienate his proper~y if it would be more advantageous 
to enjoy a loan which has'""""become favorable because of 
changed interest rates in the market. This is what may be 
termed a hindrance or an indirect restraint on alienation. 
As defined in L. SiQes and A. Smith, The Law of Future 
Interests § 1112 (2d Ed. 1956), "An indirect restraint on 
alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish 
some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, 
but with the incidental result that the instrument, if 
valid, would restrain practical alienability. 11 
The present state of the law is summarized in 3 L. Simes and 
A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests§ 1164 (2d Ed. Supp. 1981), 
where the author states: 
Mortgages payable in installments often contain 
provisions entitling the mortgagee to declare the en-
tire balance due if the mortgagor's interest in the 
mortgaged premises is transferred. Such acceleration 
clauses have usually been enforced in accordance with 
their tPrms but there is some authority that they are 
invalid as restraints on alienation or, alternatively. 
that a court of equity will deny enforcement in the 
absence of a showing that the transfer jeopardized 
the mortgagee's security. 
For amp~ication, see cases ~here cited. s~e also Annot., ~9 A.L.R. 
3d 713 (1976). For typical cases upholding the validity of the I 
clause, see Crockett v. First Federal Savings. etc., supra, and 
Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Vence Partnershio, 206 
Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980). For contrary cases, see~ 
v. Rochester Savings Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1981), 
and Wellenkamo v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 
970 (1978). For an elaborate treatment of the whole subject, in-
cluding its comment on the instant case while pending in the trial 
court, see~ v. First Federal, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). 
Our analysis of the language used in Covenant 17 shows ~hat 
enforcement of the covenant does not defeat or forfeit the estate 
conveyed. The transaction does not affect the quantity or quality~ 
of the conveyance between Borrowers and Purchaser. Its effect is ! 
confined to the acceleration of the due date of the indebtedness. 
Since public policy is at the heart of this controversy, we 
repeat observations previously made. In ~ v. Hughes, 196 
- 4 -
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Va. 117, 125, 82 S.E.2d 553, 553 (l'.)'.>4:J, we stated: 
~ The la•,.. ..... looks wi ~h favor upon the mai<ir.g of contract:: 
bet~een co~p~~ent part7es up~r. valid consideration and for 
law ul purposes. ?ubli--: pol.icy has it- place in the 1-...w of 
contracts-:--yet th<?-t '.>1ill-o' -the-wisp of the law varies and 
chan9es with the i.1terests, habits, need 1 sentiments and fashi~ns of the da~, and courts are averse to holding con-
tra7ts .unenfo~cea~ie en the ground of public policy unless 
their illegality is clear and certain. 
Code § 55-59 details elaborate provisions governing deeds of 
trust whether actually written therein or not: 
Every deed of trust to secure debts .•• unless other-
wise provided . . . shall be construed to impose and 
confer upon the parties thereto, and the beneficiaries 
~her7under, the following duties, rights, and obligations 
in like manner as if the same were expressly provided for 
by said deed of trust: 
(l} The deed shall be construed as given to secure 
the performance of ea~h of the covenants entered into by 
ti:e granter, as well as the payment of the primary obliga-
tion. 
(6) In the event of default in the payment of the 
debt secured, or any part thereof, at maturity, or in the 
payment of interest when due, or of the br~ach of anv of 
the covenants entered into or imposed upon the granter, 
then at the request of any beneficiary the trustee shall 
forthwith declare all the debts and obligations secured 
by die deed of trust at once due and pQyable. 
Thus, a general acceleration clause is read into every deed of 
trust unless otherwise provided in the instrument. Devany v. 
Colgin, 163 Va. 848, 178 S.E. 15 (1935). This acceleration 
clause covers the breach of any covenant imposed by the instru-
ment on the granter. This obviously would include a covenant 
not to convey the secured property without the consent of Lender. 
A further clue to public policy questions is the chronology 
of events in the enactment of Code§ 6.1-330.34. Its antecedent, 
Acts 1974, c. 292, added Code § 6.l-2.4 to the Code. 2 As pointed 
II 
out on brief, this last act began its legislative journey as 
House Bill 001, 3 entirely different in purpose and effect from 
j 
I 
I 
I 
ii 
1: 
Code § 6 .1-2. 4. Where any loan is made secured by a mort-
gage or deed of tr'..lst on real property comprised of one-to-four-
family residential dwelling units and t..~e note, or mortgage or 
deed of trust evidencing such loan contains a provi~don that the 
holder· c-f the note secured ! y such mortgagf or deed of tru!"" t may , 
accelerate payment of or renogo~ia.te the t-.c~s oj such loan upon I 
sale or conveyance of the security property or part thereof, th?n j' 
the mortgage or deed of trust shall contain in the b'?dy or on tne 
margin thereof the following st.J.ten'ient either :i..n ?upi ta~ lett~rs 
1
. 
or underlined: "Notice--The debt secured her~by ~s sub]ect to 1 
call in full or the terms thereof being modifJ.c~ 1~~ the event of ! 
sale or con·reyance of the ?Loperty secu:::-~<l h_ere:oy · 
- 5 -
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the final enact:71cnt.. Acts 1.975, c. 418, rccod~ficc.l Code 
6.1-2.4 with slight vari~tion as it is in the p~esent Code 
6.1-330. 34. Thus, the General Assembly, instead of prohibiting '. 
acceleration upon sale or transfer, expres~ly recognized its 
existence and provided that it should be adequately publicized. 
As indicated in Williams v. First Federal, 651 F.2d at 923-24, if 
this be a restraint on alienation, it is one validated by Virgini~ 
law as an inescapable conclusion from this statutory enactment. 
' I Borrowers and Purchaser would have us read into the accelera~ 
tion clause a proviso that in the event of a sale or transfer the ! 
I acceleration clause would not be operative unless the transfer or; 
sale would impair the security of the lender or otherwise increas~ 
its risk. In White v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. 749, 757, 164 S.E. I l 
375, 377 (1932), we quoted Stonega Coal & coke co. v. Louisville l 
& N.R.R.Co., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E.551 (1906), stating our general 
view in construing written contracts: 
While the court, in construing a contract, may take 
into view the circwnstances under which it was made, yet 
when a breach of it is averred its language must determine 
to what the parties to it bound themselves. courts are 
not authorized to make contracts for t:1em or to add tc. 
any stipulation which they have not seen proper to insert. 
See ~ Sonny Arnold, Incorporated, et al. v. Sentry Savings 
Association, et al., 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) • 
Our conclusion is that covenant 17 is not an unreasonable 
restraint on alienation and to the contrary has been sanctioned 
as part of the public policy of the Commonwealth. 
II. Land Contract. 
Borrowers and Purchaser argue that the Land Contract does not 
. I 
trigger covenant 17. They argue that it is a contract contingent. 
i 
upon the payoff of the deed of trust at which time a deed is to be 
recorded; it is neither a transfer of title nor a sale under the J 
terms of the due-on sale clause. We reject this contention. I 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
3 House Bill No. 601. § 6.1-2.3. No financial institution, 
subject to the provisions of this title, which makes. lo"n~ secured 
by real property, shall reserve in the instrument evid::ncing such 
loan or in the deed of trust on the real property serv1n~ as sccu~ 
rity for such loa.n the righ~ to call the loan or rcnego~~ate the 1 
terms of the loan upon the sule of the real pr?pert~ ac~ing as 
security so long as the original borrower remains liable for re-
payment of the loan. 
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This inst:rument is denominated "Land Contract for Sale of 
Improved Real Property-Virginia. 11 It provides that Purchaser 
would make a lump-sum paymont of $5,400 a·: closing; Borro·.Jers 
would execute a general warranty deed to Purchaser, the deed to 
be held in escrow until the note :;~cured by the deed of trust had 
been paid in full: Purchaser would have full possession of the 
property after closing and would assume all risks or loss; Pur-
chaser would asstune all responsibility for taxes and insurance on 
the property and appoint the escrow agent as attorney-in-fact in 
all matters concerning the property. As a practical matter, Bor-
rowers, except for original liability, had relinquished all bene-
ficial interest in the property. Covenant 17 provides for the 
activating of its provisions "if all or any part of the property 1 
or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrowers." 
Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 208, 120 S.E. 870, 873 (1924), is 
controlling, and there we said: 
When such a contract is concluded, although it is wholly 
executory in form, it clothes the purchaser with an equit-
able estate in the land and the vendor ~ith an equitable 
ownership of the purchase money. This because equity 
treats that as done which ought to be done by the terms 
of such a contract, and as the land ought to be conveyed 
to the vendee and the purchase money transferred to the 
vendor, equity regards these as done, and treats the 
vendee as having acquired property in the land, and the 
vendor as having acquired property in the price. It 
follows that as the vendee has thus acquired the full 
equitable estate, he may convey or encumber it, devise it; 
if he dies intestate it descends to his heirs at law; 
his wife is entitled to dower in it, and specific per-
formance may be enforced against his heirs at law after 
death. In fact, all the incidents of a real ownership 
belong to it. 
~. Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 455, 164 S.E.2d 703, 
706 (1968). 
We therefore hold that Covenant 17 of the deed of trust was 
breached by the execution of the Land Contract by Borrowers and 
Purchaser on April 21, 1979. 
Finally, we believe state law clearly establishes the valid-
ity of Covenant 17 .4 and we need not consider the complaint of 
The deed of trust expressly provides in part: 
15. Uniform Deed of Trust; Governing La~; Severabi-
lit . This form at deed ot trust comoines u~ifor~ ~ovcnants ~ational use ancl non-unifqr".1 covenant~ .~ .. nth 11:ni.~ed ':1Ari 
· by jurisdiction co consti.tute a uni.term security .111-
ations . u l u-opPrty This Deed of Trust shall b :~~~~~~~ g~v~~~nfa~e~f tfie IuFi~dicti.on i.n which ~he Prop~r~~ 
is located. {Etnphasi.s aadea. J 
- 7 ~ 
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I 
,I 
Borrowers and Purchaser that the trial court relied in part on 
federal law to sustain its judgment. 
Affirmed. 
II· 
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